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1 .  Introduction: The relationship between meaning and inference 
If we know the meanings of the sentences of a (natural) language !e, do we know 
then (in principle) what the valid inferences in the language are? In asking this 
question we view humans not only as speakers but also as reasoners . The 
question was asked fIrst in symbolic logic and analytic philosophy, but it is 
essential also for natural language semantics and computational linguistics . The 
relationship between meaning and inference is an important one not only because 
we must be able to reason with the semantic representations we obtain from 
utterances but also because inference is intimately bound up with the 
interpretation process itself. 
Perhaps the question asked at the beginning must be answered differel!tly 
depending on which part of the language vocabulary is concerned. With regard 
to the logical vocabulary of natural language the classical answer is summarized 
in the following thesis : 
Logicality: The meanings of the logical units of a (natural) language !e 
determine what the valid logical inferences (entailments) in that language are. 
Obviously, this thesis can be derived from two traditional assumptions: 
(A) identifying meanings with truth-conditions and (B) defIning the notion of 
entailment as validity of the conclusion in every possible case where the premises 
hold. From knowing the meanings of the premises of an argument, we can 
determine (in principle) all the possible cases where the premises are true and 
then check whether in all these cases the conclusion is true as well . If this check 
is positive (negative) the argument is (in)valid. 
The traditional view leads to a notion of entailment which obeys the 
principle of monotonicity: If a set of premises r entails a formula � and r' 
extends r ,  i .e .  r !; r' , then r' entails �. Now consider the case o f  common sense 
entailment where this principle clearly is wrong as the following example 
illustrates: 
Ravens are (normally) black 
Albin is a raven 
(Presumably) Albin is black 
Ravens are (normally) black 
Albin is a raven 
Albin is not black invalid 
(presumably) Albin is black 
In order to describe/explain such inference patterns based on the meaning of the 
involved expressions at least one of the traditional assumptions (A) and (B) must 
be given up . One possibility is to retain (A) but to modify (B) by approaching the 
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notion of entailment using a restricted set of preferred models. This approach has 
been called preference semantics. Another approach is update semantics which 
already abandons the assumption of identifying meanings with truth-conditions . 
Instead, the update approach identifies meanings with condition of information 
change and it also uses a more dynamically coloured notion of entailment. 
The logical particles of natural language that I will investigate in this study 
are certain adverbs of quantification as normally, typically, and commonly. 
Capturing the subtle differences in the meanings of these adverbs are not 
envisaged here. Instead, I will concentrate myself upon the supposed common 
semantic core of these adverbs of generic quantification. 
The aims of the present paper are threefold: First, I want to demonstrate 
that the thesis of logicality can be satisfied in connection with the phenomenon 
of nonmonotonicity if the paradigm of dynamic semantics is used; it cannot be 
satisfied in case of preference semantics. Second, I will demonstrate that the 
approach of preference semantics leads to some further problems: It cannot 
describe the coexistence of highly plausible patterns of inference like GRADED 
NORMALITY and LOGICAL CLOSURE IN THE CONSEQUENT; it cannot give an 
explanatory adequate treatment of the pattern of inference called PENGUIN 
PRINCIPLE. Finally, I want to develop a version of update semantics (called 
update semantics for prototypes) that obeys the doctrin of logicality and deals 
with the mentioned problems in a fairly explanatory way. 
In Section 2 and 3 I introduce the general ideas of preference semantics 
and dynamic semantics , respectively. Section 4 summarizes some of the crucial 
patterns of inference that are involved in reasoning with generic sentences such 
as tbs are (normally) ,ps. In Section 5 several models of nonmonotonic reasoning 
are compared and three challenging problems of these models are isolated. 
Section 6 develops the update semantics for prototypes and draws some 
conclusions. 
2. Preference semantics 
SHOHAM ( 1988) has provided a unifying semantical framework for the definition 
of nonmonotonic logics . Starting from any standard logic with a model-theoretic 
semantics , a preference logic is obtained by adding a strict partial preference 
order on interpretations to the logic. The preferred models are those maximum 
with respect to the given ordering. We can now define two notions of entailment. 
Dermition 1: Let � be a language with a model-theoretic semantics and c:: a 
strict partial order on the interpretations of � (Le. an irreflexive, asymmetric, 
and transitive relation) . Furthermore, let r be a set of formulae, CP a formula of 
�. 
(a) r classically entaUs 01 (written r � 01) iff the models of r are a subset of 
the models of CP;  
(b)  r preferentially entaUs 01 (written r )-c: CP) iff the preferred models of  r 
are a subset of the models of CP. 
Normality in Update Semantics 
The most obvious illustration for preference semantics is MCCARTHY'S ( 1980, 
1 986) (variable) predicate circumscription. Here :£ is a first order language with 
a distinguished predicate letter P whose extension is made minimal while the 
elements of a certain predicate set v (not containing P) are allowed to vary 
during the minimization. Depending on P and v the partial order on the 
interpretations of :£ is defmed as follows : M cp v M' iff (i) M and M' have the 
same domain of individuals, (ii) all predicate symbols of :£ other than P and v 
have the same extensions in M and M' , (iii) the extension of P in M' is 
contained in its extension in M. It is evident that the preferred models of a set of 
formulae r are those where the extension of the predicate P is minimized. 
To give an example let us translate generic sentences such as ravens are 
(normally) black as vx(RA VEN(x) " ...,AB(x) -+ BLACK(x» . Intuitively: Ravens 
who are not abnormal are black. AB then is the distinguished predicate letter 
whose extension should minimized while the extension of BLACK is allowed to 
vary during the minimization. This makes as few ravens as possible abnormal 
(with regard to the feature BLACK) . Now let us consider the following set of 
premises: 
r 1 = {vx(RAVEN(x) " ""AB(x) -+ BLACK(x» , RAVEN(ALBIN)} 
Using Definition 1 it is clear that r 1 preferentially entails BLACK(ALBIN) (of 
course, this conclusion is not classically entailed by r 1) .  Now let us extend r 1 as 
in the introductory example of Section 1 :  
r2 = {vx(RAVEN(x) " ""AB(x) -+ BLACK(x» , RAVEN(ALBIN) , 
""BLACK(ALBIN) } 
Obviously, the extension r 2 does not preferentially entail BLACK(ALBIN) . 
These observations demonstrate the nonmonotonicity ot the notion of preferential 
entailment and they verify an important pattern of defeasible reasoning with 
generic sentences called DEFEASmLE MODUS PONENS. 
A raven may be abnormal with respect to the hue of his feathers but 
normal in some other aspect. Thus we need different abnormality predicates ABi 
for different aspects (usually one for each generic sentence) . However, the 
unrestricted minimization of these predicates leads to several problems . For 
instance, from ravens are (normally) black, represented 
vx(RAVEN(x) " ...,AB1(x) -+ BLACK(x» ] 
and ravens can (normally) fly, represented 
Vx(RA VEN(x) " ""ABz(x) -+ CAN-FLY(x» 
it does not follow with our preference semantics that ravens are (normally) black 
and can fly, represented 
2 1  
22 Reinhard Blutner 
vx(RA VEN(x) A -'AB3(x) -+ BLACK(x) A CAN-FLY(x» . 
I fmd this prediction counterintuitive. As a second example consider the 
following set of premises : 
ravens are (normally) black 
albino ravens are (normally) not black 
all albino ravens are ravens 
Albin is an albino raven 
which is represented as 
vx(RA VEN(x) A -'AB1 (x) -+ BLACK(x» 
Vx(ALBINO-RA VEN(x) A -,AB2(x) -+ -,BLACK(x» 
vx(ALBINO-RA VEN(x) -+ RA VEN(x» 
ALBINO-RA VEN(ALBIN) 
From these premises it does not follow with our preference semantics that Albin 
is not black (represented -,BLACK(ALBIN» . Thus , the present form of 
preferential entailment does not capture the pattern of defeasible reasoning which 
sometimes has been called elsewhere condition, principle of specificity, or 
penguin principle. 
The crucial point with respect to these examples is that there must be 
additional constraints that restrict the extensions of the abnormality predicates 
during the minimization process .  In the latter case, for example, MCCARTHY 
( 1986) has introduced the notion of prioritized circumscription. Prioritized 
circumscription excludes "unwanted" minimal models by realizing priorities when 
multiple predicates are to be minimized. In the example under discussion the 
abnormality predicate related to the more specific category (i.e � has priority 
over the abnormality predicate related to the less specific one (i. e. AB1).  Thus, 
in the selected models Albin comes out as a normal Albino raven and as an 
abnormal raven. In order to choose the priorities appropriately, however, it needs 
an external mechanism that operates outside of the compositional module of 
semantic interpretation. In other words: The meanings of generic sentences are 
units that contain free parameters . These parameters can only be fixed by an 
external (context-dependent) mechanism. This suggests that the thesis of 
logicality cannot be satisfied in the case of circumscription. In Section 5 I will 
consider other models of nonmonotonic reasoning that can be mimicked by 
preference semantics and where the same conclusion can be drawn. 
For comparing different systems of monotonic and/or nonmonotonic 
reasoning it is useful to focus the study of the corresponding logical systems on 
general properties of their consequence relations . In the thirties TARSKI ( 1 930, 
1 935) stated quite generally some minimal requirements which a deductive 
consequence relation 1== must fulflll if it is truly to be a logical notion. 
GABBAY ( 1 985) was probably the first who has stated and investigated some 
minimal requirements which a nonmonotonic consequence relation )= should 
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satisfy to represent a bona fide nonmonotonic logic. Definition 2 combines both 
conceptions in a general framework for nonmonotonic formalisms called 
nonmonotonic calculus (cf. MORREAU 1992) . 
Definition 2: Let ;;e be a language and let F= and )= be relations on subsets 
of the formulas of ;;e. The triple (;;e, F=, ) ) is called a nonmonotonic 
calculus just in case 
( 1 )  F= (the monotonic core) i s  Tarskian, i .e i t  satisfies the following 
principles (here r and r'range over sets of formulas and If? over isolated 
formulas) : 
REFLEXNITY: r F= r 
CUT: if r F= r' and r u r' F= If?, then r F= IJ? 
MONOTONICITY: if r F= If?, then r u r' F= If? 
(2) )= (the nonmonotonic periphery) is a cumulative consequence relation, 
i .e.  it satisfies the following principles : 
REFLEXIVITY r )= r 
CUT: if r )= r' and r u r' )= If?, then r )= If? 
WEAK MONOTONICITY: if r )= If? and r )= r ' ,  then r U r' )= If? 
(3) The periphery )= extends the core F=, i.e. if r F= r' ,then r )= r' 
Intuitively, the monotonic core inference notion F= extracts from a set of 
premises r those conclusions which are non-defeasible with regard to any 
extension of r.  The nonmonotonic inference notion )= adds to the conclusions 
drawn by means of F= a periphery of defeasible or soft conclusions (sometimes 
called plausible inferences drawn from r) . With regard to the nonmonotonic 
periphery GABBAY (1985) and others have suggested that a nonmonotonic 
consequent relation may reasonably be required to retain at least the part of 
monotonicity which the principle of WEAK MONOTONICITY (also called 
CAUTIOUS MONOTONICITY) would salvage. 
GABBAY (1 985) argued for his three conditions REFLEXIVITY, CUT, and 
WEAK MONOTONICITY on proof-theoretic grounds but provided no semantics 
against which to check them. The following theorem shows that SHOHAM'S 
( 1 988) general model theory provides the warranted semantical foundation for 
these conditions. Moreover, it states that classical entailment and preferential 
entailment are related in the sense of Definition 2 and constitute a nonmonotonic 
calculus. 
Theorem 1 :  Let ;;e be a language with a model-theoretic semantics and c: a strict 
partial order on the interpretations of ;;e. Furthermore, let F= be the relation of 
classical entailment and )-r: the relation of preferential entailment (see 
Definition 1 ) .  Then (;;e,  1==,)  r:) constitutes a nonmonotonic calculus 
(presumed it holds some kind of limit assumption (STALNAKER 1968; LEWIS 
1 973) or smoothness condition (KRAus, LEHMANN & MAGIDOR 1 990) that 
ensures that each satisfIable set of formulae has a preferred model). 
The less trivial parts of the proof are given, for example, in KRAus, LEHMANN 
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& MAGIDOR ( 1 990) . The same paper contains a proof of the fact that preferential 
entailment satisfies the following condition (when propositional logic is the basic 
language) : 
Furthermore, there is a representation theorem that states that each cumulative 
consequence relation that satisfies OR can be represented by preferential 
entailment with regard to some preference order t:: on interpretations to the logic. 
This result suggests (at least in the propositional case) that each nonmonotonic 
calculus that satisfies OR can be represented by preference semantics . In spite of 
this result it may be useful to consider alternative semantic frameworks that 
provide a semantic foundation for nonmonotonicity and yield the the same 
conditions as those formulated in Defmition 2 for alternative reasons. 
Dynamic semantics is another general framework which can provide a 
semantic foundation of several aspects of nonmonotonicity. In contrast to 
preference semantics this approach abandons the traditional assumption of 
identifying meanings with truth-conditions . In dynamic semantics it is not the 
truth-conditional content, but the information change potential of a sentence that 
is regarded as constituting its meaning. The information change potential of a 
sentence can be considered an operation on the domain of the so-called 
information states. Depending on the definition of an information state different 
examples of dynamic semantics have been developed such as dynamic predicate 
logic (GROBNENDDK & STOKHOF 1991)  and update semantics (VELTMAN 1 994) . 
These systems can be considered formalizing different aspects of the dynamics of 
discourse. In this section I will provide a general formulation which is oriented 
towards VELTMAN'S ( 1994) update semantics . 
Let (1 be an information state and � a formula of a basic language :£ with 
meaning [�] (an operation on information states) .  Let us write (1[�] for the 
information state that results by applying [�] to (1. Intuitively, (1[�] denotes the 
information state that results when (1 is updated with �. Truth (or acceptance) 
now becomes a secondary notion which can derived from the primary notion of 
information change. A formula � will be called true (accepted) in (1 if the 
information conveyed by � is already subsumed by (1: if (1 is updated with � ,  the 
resulting information state turns out to be (1 again. 
Definition 3: Let (1 be an information state and � a formula in :£. Then � is 
called true (accepted) in (I, (I II- � ,  iff q[�] = (1. 
Now let us borrow from VELTMAN ( 1994) the following two notions of 
entailment which I will call for obvious reasons static and dynamic entailment. 
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Definition 4: let be r = (v l '  . . .  , v J a sequence of formulas in ;;£ and let 4> be 
an isolated formula of ;;£. 
(a) (it!, • • •  , "l'n) statically entails • (written r Fstat 4» iff 
from u If- Vi for every 1 :::;; i :::;; n it follows that u If- 4>. 
(b) (it!, • • •  , "l'n) dynamically entails 4> (written r )  dyn 4» iff 
[v1]  . . .  [vn] If- 4>. (Here 0 denotes the so-called minimal information state) 
A sequence of premises statically entails a conclusion iff one cannot accept all 
the premises without having to accept the conclusion as well. A sequence of 
premises dynamically entails a conclusion iff updating the minimal information 
state 0 with the premises in the given order yields an information state that 
affirms the conclusion. (Without debating the lattice-theoretic structure of 
information states , I will assume that there is such a thing as the minimal 
information state) . From the definition of static entailment it immediately follows 
that it is Tarskian, i .e .  it satisfies REFLExIvITY, CUT, and MONOTONICITY. Note 
that the order of the premises in (VI ' • . •  , v J is not essential for its static 
entailments . 
For discussing the notion of dynamic entailment we have to consider the 
following principles : 
IDEMPOTENCE: For any information state u and formula 4> of ;;£: u[4>] [4>] = 
u[4>] (i .e .  u[4>] If- 4» . 
COMMUTATIVITY: For any information state u and formulae 4>1  and 4>2 of ;;£: 
u[4>d[4>2] = u[4>2] [4>d ·  
STABn...ITY: For any information state u and formulae 4>, v o f  ;;£:  if u If- 4> , then 
u[v] If- 4>. 
In the present context the principle of IDEMPOTENCE can be taken for granted. 
Intuitively, updating an information state with 4> has the consequence that 4> 
becomes accepted after the information change. Assuming IDEMPOTENCE yields 
) dyn as a reflexive relation. Furthermore, we have the following order­
sensitive variants of CUT and WEAK MONOTONICITY: 
CUT + : If (V1 '  . . .  'V� ) dyn A and (v1 , . . .  ,vn,A» dyn 4>, then 
(vI , · · · ,vJ )  dyn 4>. 
WEAK MONOTONICITY+ :  If (v 1 '  . . . ' v J )  dyn 4> and (v 1 ' . . .  ' v J ) dyn A, then 
(VI ' . • • ,vn,A» dyn 4>.  
The order of the premises is  essential. Violations of COMMUTATIVITY, for 
instance, make the following variant of CUT invalid in the general case: 
However, if we assume COMMUTATIVITY to be a general principle, then the 
order of the premises does no matter and CUT and WEAK MONOTONICITY hold 
in the sense of Definition 2 .  
25 
26 Reinhard Blutner 
Now let us presuppose COMMUTATIVITY and IOEMPOTENCE as valid 
principles of information change. Then it is simple to show that ) dyn extends 
I==stat. The discussion so far can be summarized in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2: Let be I==stat and ) dyn the relations of static and dynamic 
entailment as given in Definition 4 and let be COMMUTATIVITY and 
IOEMPOTENCE valid principles of information change. Then (;e, I==stat, ) dyn) 
constitutes a nonmonotonic calculus. 
If STABILITY is satisfied as an additional principle, then ) dyn becomes 
monotonic. The two notions of entailment, I==stat and ) dyn, completely agree 
if moreover the following condition of expressibility is satisfied: every inform­
ation state (f can be expressed as (f = O[r] , for some set r of formulas of ;e. 
The Theorems 1 and 2 state that both preference semantics and dynamic 
semantics are qualified for constituting a nonmonotonic calculus in the sense of 
Definition 2 .  One difference between preference semantics and dynamic 
semantics is that the former framework needs no further restriction to reproduce 
the conditions of Definition 2 whereas the latter needs two further conditions that 
are not constitutive for this framework: IOEMPOTENCE and COMMUTATIVITY. 
Though it is plausible to assume IOEMPOTENCE in update semantics it is not so 
for COMMUTATIVITY. VELTMAN (1994) , for instance, has discusses some clear 
violations of COMMUTATIVITY. Non-commutativity is found in connection with 
modal qualifications like presumably, probably, must, may or might. As an 
illustration let us consider the following two sequences (cf. VELTMAN 1994: 2) : 
- Somebody is knocking at the door . . .  Presumably, it 's John . . .  It 's Mary. 
- Somebody is knocking at the door . . .  It 's Mary . . .  Presumably, it 's John. 
These two sentences consist of the same sentences , only the order differs .  
Nevertheless the first sequence makes sense, whereas the second does not. 
Explanation: if I hear someone knocking at the door, I may have the expectation 
that it is , say, John. Still, in that situation it is perfectly possible for me to fmd 
out that it is Mary who is knocking, not John. On the other hand, once I have 
found out that Mary is knocking at the door, it is excluded that it is John, and 
then it is quite absurd to say that I have the expectation that it is John. 
The capacity of dynamic semantics to comprehend the phenomenon of 
non-commutativity in natural language semantics is a crucial advantage of the 
dynamic paradigm. In Section 6 I will use this capacity in order to develop an 
improved update semantics for adverbs of generic quantification. 
4. Inference patterns for prototypes 
Intuitively, there are two kinds of reasoning with sentences involving generic 
quantification. The first corresponds to a relation between the premises and 
conclusion of an argument which holds whenever truth is invariably passed from 
the former to the latter. Inferring Ravens are (normally) black and can fly from 
Normality in Update Semantics 
Ravens are (normally) black and Ravens can (normally) fly presumably is a good 
candidate of this kind of reasoning. The second kind of reasoning with generic 
sentences enables us to jump to reasonable conclusions whenever we don't have 
unlimited resources for gathering all the facts which bear on our decisions. This 
non truth-preserving mode of inferring is called plausible reasoning. It is 
exemplified by inference patterns such as DEFEASffiLE MODUS PONENS and 
PENGUIN PRINCIPLE mentioned above. 
In Section 2 the distinction between a monotonic core and a nonmonotonic 
periphery has been introduced in order to reflect the two modes of reasoning on 
a very abstract level . Furthermore, we have seen how the paradigms of 
preference semantics and dynamic semantics , respectively,- are able to explicate 
the two kinds of entailment that correspond to that distinction. In this Section I 
will give an (incomplete) list of the patterns of monotonic (non-defeasible) and 
nonmonotonic (defeasible) inference involved in reasoning with generic 
quantification. For obvious reasons, I will call these schemes inference patterns 
for prototypes. 
Let us assume a binary generalized quantifier > which is the supposed 
common integrator of adverbs of generic quantification as normally, typically, 
and commonly. Intuitively, a formula <P > 1/; (<p and 1/; are one-place predicate 
expressions) is intended to mean that <ps are normally 1/;s .  Among the patterns of 
nondefeasible inference that the logical analysis of the adverbs of generic 
quantification under consideration should explain are the following two: 
MI 1 :  DISJUNCTIVE ANTECEDENTS or DUDLEY DOORITE 
<PI > 1/;, <P2 > 1/; 1=== (<PI v <P2) > 1/;; 
e .g .  Mathematicians are (normally) good musicians, physicists are (normally) 
good musicians 1=== mathematicians and physicists are (normally) good 
musicians. 
MI 2: LOGICAL CLOSURE IN TIlE CONSEQUENT 
If 1/;l (x) , . . .  , 1/;n(x) 1=== 'Y(x) then <P > 1/;1 '  . . .  , <p > 1/;n 1=== <P > 'Y; 
e .g .  Ravens are (normally) black, ravens can (normally) fly 1=== Ravens are 
(normally) black and can fly (CONJUNCTION IN TIlE CONSEQUENT) ; 
Ravens are (normally) black 1=== ravens are (normally) black or can fly 
(WEAKENING IN TIlE CONSEQUENT) . 
In order to express the patterns of defeasible inference in a sufficient general way 
we need the notion of (logically) independent predicate expressions: 
Dermition 5 (from ASHER & MORREAU 1991 :  26) : A system {<PI ' . . .  ,<pn} of 
one-place predicate expressions of a basic language :£ is called logically 
independent just in case for all individual constants c ,  each Boolean combination 
containing at most one instance of each of <Pl (c) , . . .  ,<Pn(c) is satisfiable. 
Now the nonmonotonic component of any reasonable logical analysis of generic 
sentences should explain at least the following patterns of inference: 
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NMI 1:  DEFEASIBLE MODUS PONENS 
For any logically independent system {4> ,1/1} of predicate expressions of $£ and 
any individual constant c of $£ it holds : 
4> > 1/1, 4>(c) )= 1/I(c) , but not 4> > 1/1, 4>(c) , -' 1/I(c) )= 1/I(c) ; 
e .g .  Ravens are (normally) black, Albin is a raven )= (presumably) Albin is 
black, but not: Ravens are (normally) black, Albin is a raven, Albin is not black 
)= (presumably) Albin is black. 
NMI 2: 1HE NIXON DIAMOND 
For any logically independent system {4>1 ,4>2 ,1/I} of predicate expressions of ;e 
and any individual constant c of ;e it holds neither 
4> 1 >  1/1, 4>2 >  -' 1/1, 4>1(c) , 4>2(c) )= 1/I(c) nor 4>1 >  1/1, 4>2 >  -' 1/1, 4>1(c) , 4>2(c) )= 
-' 1/I(c) ; 
e .g .  There is irresolvable conflict in the following: Quakers are (normally) 
pacifists, Republicans are (normally) non pacifists, Nixon is Quaker and 
Republican. 
NMI 3: TAXONOMIC PENGUIN PRINCIPLE 
For any logically independent systems {4> 1 , 1/I} and {4>2, 1/1} of predicate 
expressions of ;e and any individual constant c of $£ it holds : If ch is more 
specific than 4>1 (i.e. 4>2(x) F= 4>1(x» , then 
4>1 > 1/1, 4>2 > -' 1/1, 4>2(c» = -'1/I(c) , but not 4>2 > 4>1 ' 4>1 > 1/1, 4>2 > -' 1/1, 4>2(c» = 
1/I(c) ; 
e .g .  suppose as logical truth that all penguins are birds, then birds can 
(normally) fly, penguins (normally) can 't fly, Tweety is a penguin )= 
(presumably) Tweety can 't fly, but not )= (presumably) Tweety can fly. 
NMI 4: WEAK PENGUIN PRINCIPLE 
For any logically independent system {4> 1 ,4>2 ,1/I} of predicate expressions of ;e 
and any individual constant c of ;e it holds 
4>2 > 4>1 , 4> 1 > 1/1. 4>2 > -' 1/1, 4>2(c» = -' 1/I(c) , but not 
4>2 > 4> 1 , 4> 1 > 1/1, 4>2 >  -' 1/1, 4>2(c) )= 1/I(c) ; 
e .g .  Students are (normally) adults, adults are (normally) employed, students are 
(normally) not employed, Sam is a student )= (presumably) Sam is not 
employed, but not )= (presumably) Sam is employed. 
NMI S: GRADED NORMALITY 
For any logically independent system {4>1 ,4>2, 1/I} of predicate expressions of ;e 
and any individual constant c of ;e it holds 
4» 1/11 , 4» 1/12' 4>(c) , -' 1/Il (c) )= 1/I2(c) , but not 
4» 1/11 , 4» 1/12' 4>(c) , -' 1/Il(c) )= -' 1/I2(c) 
e.g . Ravens are (normally) black, ravens can (normally) fly, Albin is a raven, 
Albin is not black )= (presumably) Albin can fly, and does not )= 
(presumably) Albin cannot fly. 
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NMI 6: SEPARATION EFFECT 
For any logically independent systems {¢ , 1/td and {¢ , 1/t2} of predicate 
expressions of ;;£ and any individual constant c of ;;£ it holds : whenever {1/t1(c) ,  
-, 1/t2(c)} is logically consistent, then 
¢ >  (1/t1 V 1/t�, ¢(c) ,  -, 1/t1 (c) )= 1/t2(c) ,  but not ¢ >  1/t1 , ¢(c) ,  -, 1/t1(c) )= 1/t2(c) .  
e .g .  Tigers (normally) have four or five legs, Shere Khan is a tiger. Shere Khan 
does not have four legs )= (presumably) Shere Khan has five legs, but not: 
Tigers (normally) have four legs, Shere Khan is a tiger, Shere Khan does not 
have four legs )= (presumably) Shere Khan has five legs. 
All of these patterns of inference are familiar from the literature. An possible 
exception is the last pattern of defeasible reasoning which is due to VELTMAN 
( 1 991 ) .  VELTMAN (1994) has discussed this pattern in connection with the 
intuitive validity of LOGICAL CLOSURE IN THE CONSEQUENT (MI 2) . In the 
subsequent discussion I comment on some of the intuitive and theoretic problems 
that are associated with these patterns of inference. 
5. Some m06els of nonmonotonic reasoning and three challenging problems 
There are several models of nonmonotonic reasoning that provide, in some more 
or less direct sense, a defInition of the generic quantifIer > and capture at least 
some of the inference patterns for prototypes listed above. In this section I will 
assume some familiarity with these models (for introductory material see, for 
example, BREWKA 1 99 1 ;  MORREAU 1992) . 
The models considered here are the following: 
(a) Circumscription: (MCCARTHY 1 980; 1986) 
¢ > 1/t =def Vx(¢(x) A -,Abj(x) - 1/t(x» 
(b) Default Logic: (REITER 1 980) 
¢ > 1/t  =def ¢(x) : M 1/t(x) / 1/t(x) 
(c) Autoepistemic Logic: (MOORE 1 985) 
¢ > 1/t  =def O¢(x) A -, o -, 1/t(x) - o1/t(x) 
(d) Update Semantics (VELTMAN 1 994) 
¢ > 1/t: t -+ ..y  
(e) Common Sense Entailment (ASHER & MORREAU 1 991)  
¢ > 1/t  =def ¢(x) > x 1/t(x) 
Among these models the fIrst three can bee seen as to be compatible with the 
unifying framework of preference semantics. In the case of circumscription, the 
compatibility with preference semantics is perfectly clear. With respect to default 
logic and autoepistemic logic SHOHAM ( 1988) has shown that these systems can 
be described - at least approximately - by a preference ordering on the 
interpretations of a corresponding language ;;£ (see also BREWKA 1 991) .  
VELTMAN'S (1 994) update semantics is the first (and perhaps the best hitherto 
existing) representative of dynamic semantics that deals with inference patterns 
for prototypes. Common Sense Entailment (ASHER & MORREAU 1 991 )  rests upon 
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elements of the dynamic approach. Strictly speaking, however, it is neither a 
representative of dynamic semantics nor a representative of preference semantics , 
but it should be seen as a theory sui generis involving a three-step design for 
dynamic information models :  (i) a set of information states containing a 
particular information state representing ignorance or minimal knowledge, (ii) an 
update function, (iii) assuming individuals to be normal representatives of kinds -
modelled by defming the notion of (iteratized) normalization. 
Figure 1 compares the mentioned models of nonmonotonic reasoning with 








(Asher & Morreau) 
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Figure 1 :  Some models for representing nonmonotonic reasoning patterns ( • : 
the corresponding inference pattern has been correctly described; 0 :  the 
inference pattern cannot be described correctly; � : in order to describe the 
inference pattern correctly some external mechanism is needed) 
Each of the models captures the classical patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning 
DEFEASffiLE MODUS PONENS and the NIXON DIAMOND. Noteworthy, the same 
holds for the pattern of inference which I have called SEPARATION EFFECT. 
The latter pattern has been introduced by VELTMAN (1994) in order to 
offer an argument against WEAKENING OF mE CONSEQUENT (a special case of the 
general pattern LOGICAL CLOSURE IN mE CONSEQUENT, MI 2) in theories of 
defeasible reasoning involving generics . Consider the two generic sentences 
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Tigers normally have four legs. 
Tigers normalty have four or five legs. 
According to the general principle MI 2 the first sentence makes a statement 
which is logically stronger than that made by the second sentence. Despite of this 
fact the second sentence seems to suggest conclusions that are not sanctioned by 
the first sentence. To give an example, VELTMAN ( 1994) assumes an tiger called 
Shere Khan who does not have four legs. Then the second but not the first 
sentence suggests to assume that Shere Khan has five legs (cf. the pattern called 
SEPARATION EFFECT, NMI 6) . VELTMAN ( 1 994) concludes from these 
observations , which are quite right, I think, that the principle MI 2 must be 
given up (especially the special case of this principle called WEAKENING OF THE 
CONSEQUENT) . However, as argued by MORREAU ( 1992) , this conclusion is not 
convincing. It is the nonmonotonic notion of consequence which is involved in 
the Shere Khan-example and not the monotonic one. The possibility that a 
conclusion like Shere Khan has five legs can be withdrawn on moving from a set 
of premises to a logically stronger set (by substituting tigers normalty have four 
legs for tigers normalty have four or five legs) is exactly the sort of thing that a 
defeasible consequence notion makes room for. Consequently, I think: 
VELTMAN'S  example should not be taken as an argument against LOGICAL 
CLOSURE IN THE CONSEQUENT, but as a challenge to develop a theory that 
simultaneously satisfies LOGICAL CLOSURE IN THE CONSEQUENT and the 
SEPARATION EFFECT. As can be seen from Figure 1 ,  ASHER & MORREAU'S 
( 1 991)  Commonsense Entailment is such a theory. In Section 6 another one is 
developed. 
The second challenge has to do with the coexistence of GRADED 
NORMALITY and LOGICAL CLOSURE IN THE CONSEQUENT. Figure 1 tells us that 
none of the known models satisfies both patterns simultaneously. The question 
arises of whether this is an accidental situation or whether this happens for 
systematic reasons . MORREAU ( 1992: 146) has proved a theorem that shows the 
second possibility is right: given a nonmonotonic calculus in the sense of 
Definition 2 and given that )= (the nonmonotonic peripery) is closed under 
modus ponens, then MI 2 (LOGICAL CLOSURE IN THE CONSEQUENT) and NMI 5 
(GRADED NORMALITY) cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Each of the given 
models of defeasible reasoning is conform to the principles underlying the 
premises of MORREAU'S  theorem. Consequently, in such cases the incompatibility 
of MI 2 and NMI 5 is a matter of logical necessity. Furthermore, this result can 
be generalized with respect to all models that are formulated within the paradigm 
of preference semantics (as a consequence of Theorem 1) .  
With regard to dynamic semantics the situation looks different. Only if we 
have COMMUTATIVITY as a valid principle of information change, then the 
premises of MORREAU'S theorem are satisfied, i .e. we are concerned with a 
nonmonotonic calculus in the strict sense of Definition 2 (cf. Theorem 2) . 
VELTMAN'S (1994) theory is an example for a dynamic approach where 
COMMUTATIVITY has been assumed to be a valid principle of information change 
when it comes to evaluate adverbs of generic quantification. I take it as a 
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challenge to develop a version of update semantics where COMMUTATIVITY is 
violated in some cases , and, as a consequence, MI 2 and NMI S can be satisfied 
simultaneously. In the next section I will present such a theory. 
The third challenge concerns the question of explanatory adequacy. Take 
as an example the pattern of defeasible inference NMI 4 (WEAK PENGUIN 
PRINCIPLE) . None of the known models deals with this pattern of inference in a 
truly explanatory way . In Prioritized Circumscription, for example, one has to 
ftx a "minimization strategy"  saying which predicates are to be minimized and in 
which order (cf. Section 2) . The intuitive idea that more speciftc information 
takes precedence over less speciftc then must be explicitly built into this strategy. 
Certainly, in this way an "extraneous ghost" can steer the mechanism toward the 
intuitively desired conclusion (expressed by the penguin principle) , but this is not 
a true explanation in any interesting scientiftc sense. It appears to me that the 
same evaluation is valid in case of the other models that can be described (at 
least approximately) by the preferential approach, especially (prioritized) default 
logic and (hierarchic) autoepistemic logic (see BREWKA 1991) .  Taken together, 
these observations provide circumstantial evidence that the thesis of logicality 
cannot be satisfted in case of preference semantics if this approach is to describe 
the inference patterns for prototypes . 
However, even "ghost-free" models such as ASHER & MORREAU'S ( 1991)  
Commonsense Entailment and VELTMAN's (1 994) Update Semantics fail to give 
a true explanation of the PENGUIN PRINCIPLE in the general case. At best, these 
models can be seen as deriving this principle from a related condition on another 
level of description (e.g .  from a condition on model frames) . How to explain the 
PENGUIN PRINCIPLE from independently motivated conditions of information 
update? I consider this a fundamental challenge and an opportunity that dynamic 
semantics should make use of. 
6 .  An update semantic for prototypes 
The ftnal part of the paper develops a version of dynamic semantics that 
deals with the three challenges mentioned before. To simplify matters , I use 
VELTMANs (1994) language ;e3At as basic language. This language is an 
extension of ordinary propositional logic ;elt with At as its nonlogical 
vocabulary (the atomic sentences) , and has in its logical vocabulary two 
additional unary operators necessarily and presumably,  one additional binary 
operator " ...... (� .... v is to be read as � normally implies v) , and an punctuation 
sign denoted by " ; "  (for sequence) . 
In accordance with STALNAKER (1968) , VELTMAN (1 994) , and others an 
epistemic approach to semantics is adopted. The fundamental notion of the 
analysis is that of a knowledge state. First of all , a knowledge state is a subset s 
of a given domain W of possible worlds and may be thought of as representing 
the factual knowledge of an epistemic subject. In addition to this "external " 
component, there is an " internal" component in the semantics which in a sense 
mirrors a person' s  expectations and presumptions. This component uses several 
layers of possible hypotheses !::. l/ . .  . IAn to represent different degrees of 
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reliability. (This idea corresponds to REsCHER'S ( 1 964) ordered subtheories and 
BREWKA' S ( 1 99 1 ) level default theories , but it deviates in significant respects 
from VELTMAN'S ( 1 994) expectation frames) . Each part ..:1j of the " internal " 
component contains propositions (set of possible worlds) that encode the default 
rules (at level i) that the agent is acquainted with. Rules at level i are of higher 
reliability than rules at level j if i < j .  Furthermore, a proposition w is assumed 
which is determined by the content of the strict rules that the agent is acquainted 
with. These rules do not allow for exceptions; consequently, it is assumed that 
s � w. In some sense the proposition w can be seen to encode the rules with the 
highest reliability. 
Definition 6: Let be W = <P(At) the set of possible worlds . Then u = 
{s ,w, [..:11/ • •  . I�]} is a knowledge state (on the basis of a layered system of 
expectations) iff 
(a) s � w � W  
(b) � (1  ::;; i ::;; n) are sets of propositions 
The knowledge state 0 = (W,W, [0]) is called the minimal state; the knowledge 
state 1 = (0,0, [0]) is called the absurd state. 
Furthermore, the notions of resulting expectation sets (corresponding to 
REsCHER' S  (1 964) notion of preferred maximally consistent subsets) and weak 
acceptability are defined as follows : 
Defmition 7: A knowledge state u = (s ,w , [..:11 / • .  . 1..:1n]) has a resulting 
expectation set ..:1 ' (of propositions) iff ..:1' = ..:11 '  U . . .  U ..:1n' for some �' � ..:1j 
( 1  ::;; i ::;; n) and for all k ( 1 ::;; k ::;; n) ..:11 ' U . . .  U ..:1k' is a maximal subset of 
..:11 U . . .  U ..:1k that is consistent with the proposition s.  
Defmition 8: A proposition 0 is  weakly accepted in u iff 0 ;2 s n [ n ..:1 '] for 
each resulting expectation set ..:1'  of u. 
Now we are ready to explain our update clauses for the formulae of the basic 
language !£3At• The update clauses for ordinary propositional formulae CP, for 
necessarily(cp) , presumably(cp) , and (cp ;ir) are simply translations of VELTMAN'S 
( 1 994) update clauses into the present framework. Let cP be a formula of :£OAt 
and let [ cp ]  designate the proposition expressed by CPo Notice that [ cp ]  can be 
calculated using the usual recursive conditions : [ p ]  = {z E W: p E z} for atoms 
p ,  [ ocJ> ]  = W\ [ cp ] ,  [ cp  1\ ir ]  = [ cp ]  n [ cJ> ] ,  [ cp  v ir ]  = [ cp ]  U [ cJ> ]  for 
any formulae cP and ir von !£OAt. Now let us assume the following : u[cp] changes 
the s-component of the knowledge state into s n [ cp ]  (leaving everything else 
unchanged) ; u[necessarily(cp)] changes the s-component into s n  [ cp ]  and the w­
component into w n  [ cp ] ;  ofpresumably(cp)] describes a test and checks whether 
[ cp ]  is weakly accepted in u or not; the punctuation sign " ; " designates 
functional composition, i .e. u[x l ;xil = u[xtl [xil . 
The crucial deviation from VELTMAN ( 1 994) concerns the update clause 
for cp .... ir. For its formulation we need an operator G on knowledge states that de-
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letes  the factual knowledge fro m  0' ,  i . e .  G« S , W , [A1 / . . .  /An] } )  = 
(w, w ,  [AI 1 . . , /  �]) . It is intuitively plausible to consider � ... iF accepted in 0' iff the 
following condition is satisfied: the proposition [ if ]  is weakly accepted in 
G(u)[�] . I tend to consider this condition a variant on the Ramsey test in line 
with the rephrasing of �"'iF as asserting that � in the normal course of events 
tends to imply if. For convenience, let us call this condition the Ramsey 
condition. 
According to the present dynamic approach, the update clause for � ... iF 
describes a kind of learning with minimal effort. Being more precise, it is 
assumed that a knowledge state 0' does not change by updating with � ... iF when 
the corresponding Ramsey condition already is satified with respect to u. In the 
other case it is assumed that a new (default) rule with content [ �iF ]  is added 
to the hypotheses actually at the smallest l(!\lel of reliability where successful 
learning is possible (Le.  the Ramsey condition is satisfied with respect to the 
resulting knowledge state) . 
It can be shown that successful learning is always possible when 
w n  [ �"'iF ] ;c 0. (In the case that w n  [ �iF ]  = o let us identify u[� ... iF] 
with the absurd knowledge state 1) .  In case of normality expressions with 
"conflicting information " (consider, for instance, the pair BIRD-+CAN -FLY, 
PENGUIN ... .., CAN - FLY) it is this idea of adding information at the smallest 
l(!\lel of reliability where successful updating is possible that leads to the effect 
that more specific information takes precedence over less specific one. 
Consequently , the pattern of defeasible reasoning called PENGUIN PRINCIPLE can 
be explained without further ad hoc-stipulations, specifically, without an external 
"ghost" that fixes the relevant parameters . 
In order to give an exact formulation of the update clause for ....  it is 
useful to consider the following notion of the i-refinement of a layered system of 
expectations: 
DEFINITION 9: Let [A1/  . .  ' /An] be a layered system of expectations , 0 a 
proposition, and 0 � i � n. Then 
{ [{O}/.al/ . .  . I�] 
[.al/ . .  . /� U {d}/ . .  . I.aJ 
if i = O  
else 
is called the i-refmement of a layered system of expectations with o.  
Adding information at the smallest level of reliability now simply means 
performing the maximal i-refmement with the corresponding proposition. 
Officially stated, the defmition of the update semantic for the basic 
language ;£3At is as follows: 
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DEFINITION 10: Let a = (s ,w,[AI/ . .  . lAn]) be a knowledge state. For all 
ordinary propositional formulae cJ? and iF and all sequences (Xl ;X2) of :£It it 
holds: 
= { 1 if s lt [ cJ? ] = 0  (s it  [ cJ? ] ,w, [AI / . . .  /An]) else 
{ I  if S it  [ cJ? ] = 0 
(s it  [ cJ? ] ,W It [ cJ? ] , [AI / . .  . lAn]) else { (
l
S ,W , [AI/ . . . lAn]) if [ cJ? ] is weakly 
accepted in a 
else 
1 if w it  [ �iF ] = 0 
(s ,w,[AI/ . .  . lAn]) if [ iF ] is weakly 
accepted in G( a)[ [ cJ? ] ] 
(s ,w,[AI/ . .  . IAn] U i*{ [ cJ?-iF ] }) else 
In the last line i* denotes the biggest natural number between 0 and n 
which satisfies the condition that [ iF ] is weakly accepted in the 
knowledge state (w,w,[AI/ . .  . lAn] U i* [ �iF ] ) [cJ?] . 
It can be proved that each formula cJ? of our basic language :£3 At satisfies 
a[cJ?] If- cJ? (for any knowledge state a) . Consequently, the notion of dynamic 
entailment ) dyn complies with the principle of REFLEXIVITY: cJ? )  d n cJ? 
Furthermore, dynamic entailment complies with the principles of CUT� and 
WEAK MONOTONICITY+ as introduced in Section 3 .  A particular examination of 
the proposed update model shows that all of the inference patterns for prototypes 
introduced in Section 4 hold with respect to F=stat and ) dyn' respectively. In 
the case of the patterns of defeasible inference the order of the premises is 
important and should be as given in NMI 1 - NMI 6. 
A disadvantage of the notion ) dyn is that it is highly non-commutative, 
i .e .  the order of premises is essential in most cases. This disadvantage can be 
overcome with a notion of dynamic entailment that involves repeated updating 
with the premises , roughly: r * )  dyn cJ? iff O[r] . . .  [r] If- cJ? With respect to the 
notion * )  dyn it can be shown that NMI 1 - NMI 6 hold independent on the 
order of the premises . Furthermore, it can be shown that F=stat and *)  dyn 
form a nonmonotonic calculus in the sense of Defmition 2 (with CUT+ and WEAK 
MONOTONICITY+ instead of CUT and WEAK MONOTONICITY, respectively, in the 
definition of the nonmonotonic periphery) . 
35 
36 Reinhard Blutner 
Interestingly enough, a residue of non-commutativity remains . This 
residue is inevitable in order to secure the coexistence of GRADED NORMALITY 
and LOGICAL CLOSURE IN THE CONSEQUENT. But the order of the premises is 
significant only in cases where we have logical dependencies as in 
Tigers normally have four legs; tigers normally have four or five legs. 
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